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Abstract: Institutional reforms can profoundly alter the competitive positions of firms. Yet there has been 
limited research on which firms benefit most from these reforms: are the opportunities they create seized 
primarily by the most prominent firms, thus perpetuating a ‘rich get richer’ dynamic, or by previously 
peripheral firms, thus leveling the playing field? We address this question by exploring how intellectual 
property rights (IPR) reforms affect firms’ access to international alliances, a valuable channel of 
resources for firms in emerging markets. We find a significant increase in the number of international 
alliances formed by firms from the reforming countries corresponding precisely with the timing of IPR 
law improvements. This increase is strongest for firms that were ‘peripheral’ pre-reform: those that were 
of low status in the global alliance network and those located outside major cities in the reforming 
countries. Peripheral firms also benefitted the most from IPR improvements in terms of the quality of 
their alliance portfolios, gaining partners of higher status, from technologically stronger countries, and 
from a wider diversity of countries. Our study suggests that institutions play a role in mitigating Matthew 
effects in global alliance networks. 
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 Have the institutional changes that enabled globalization alleviated or exacerbated inequities in 
access to economic resources? Recent events have brought this question to the forefront of popular and 
academic discourse (Antras et al. 2017, Garlock 2015). The fundamental issue is whether the 
opportunities enabled by globalization-focused institutional reforms largely accrue to those with pre-
existing advantages, thus exacerbating inequality, or whether they accrue to previously disadvantaged 
actors, bringing about a more equitable distribution of access to resources. Much of the focus has been on 
examining this question at the level of individuals. Yet how institutions influence disparity in resource 
access between firms is also an important issue, particularly for strategy scholars, because it affects which 
firms gain competitive advantage, the intensity of competition in industries, and the competitiveness of 
the economy as a whole. Which firms capture the benefits of institutional reforms is therefore a critical 
yet under-investigated question. 
We address one aspect of this broad question by examining how reforms that strengthen 
intellectual property rights (IPR) laws affect the ability of firms from the reforming country to access 
international alliance partners. Alliances with foreign firms are an important resource for firms because 
they serve as a channel to access new markets, technologies, and knowledge (Lavie and Miller 2008). 
These partnerships are particularly important for firms in emerging economies, for whom they are a 
critical channel for learning and upgrading capabilities (Siegel 2007). While the value creation potential 
of international alliances is clear, the institutional environment in emerging economies raises value 
appropriation concerns that act as barriers to access foreign alliance partners. Perhaps the most salient of 
these barriers is weak IPR, which makes foreign firms unwilling to partner with local firms for fear of 
exposing their intangible assets without any assurance of appropriating the value of such assets (Shih and 
Wang 2013). Consequently, efforts to promote international exchange and link firms to global markets 
(such as trade agreements) typically include significant provisions to improve IPR protection around the 
world (Braga 2016). We ask whether enhanced access to international alliances after countries strengthen 
IPR institutions accrues primarily to firms that were already able to participate in international alliances in 
the pre-reform regime, or whether these reforms “level the playing field” by benefitting firms with few 
opportunities to access international partners pre-reform. 
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In particular, we focus on how improvements in IPR laws affect the impact that a firm’s status in 
the global alliance network has on its opportunities to access international alliance partners. High-status 
firms, or those most centrally located in a network, tend to disproportionately attract new partners (Gulati 
and Gargiulo 1999). This empirical regularity is often labeled ‘the Matthew Effect’: the rich get richer 
because those seeking new partners prefer to attach themselves to firms that are highly visible and 
reputable in the network (Bothner et al. 2011, Merton 1968). This dynamic is likely to play out with 
respect to international alliance formation in weak IPR regimes because, in the absence of formal 
institutional protection against expropriation, foreign firms are forced to rely on informal, reputational 
means of governing alliances with local partners (Gao et al. 2017). In this situation, foreign firms should 
gravitate towards high-status local firms for two reasons: they are more visible, and their status functions 
as a signal of trustworthiness (Sauder, Lynn and Podolny 2012). Indeed, research shows that the potential 
loss of status firms would suffer by behaving opportunistically serves as a credible deterrent (Phillips et 
al. 2013). These considerations suggest that, when IPR laws are weak, the Matthew Effect will prevail 
because firms of high-status will disproportionally accrue alliances with foreign partners. However, we 
have little understanding of whether and how this dynamic changes when formal institutional protections 
(like IPR laws) are strengthened. On the one hand, we may expect the importance of status in attracting 
foreign partners to diminish since there is now an alternative means of assurance. On the other hand, the 
high-status firms may be best positioned to seize on the new foreign partnering opportunities enabled by 
institutional improvements because they are seen as more desirable partners by foreign firms.  
We examine this issue by studying quantity and quality of alliances formed by firms from thirteen 
countries that passed substantial patent protection reforms during 1991-1999 (Branstetter et al. 2006). We 
exploit variations in the timing of the passage of these reforms across countries to set up a difference-in-
differences design. Our findings reveal a significant increase in the number of international alliances 
formed by firms from the reforming countries corresponding precisely with the timing of the passage of 
IPR laws. Most central to our purposes, the increase was strongest for firms that were previously 
disadvantaged in access to international alliances: those that were of lower status in the alliance network 
pre-reform. The strengthening of the formal institutions diminished the importance of status as a driver of 
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international alliance formation. In further support of the broader notion that the reforms were particularly 
beneficial to firms that were previously peripheral, we also found that the increase in international 
alliances post-reform was more pronounced for firms that were located outside the political and 
commercial capitals of the reforming countries. Beyond quantity, we also found that the reforms also 
disproportionately enhanced the quality of peripheral firms’ alliance partners: they were able to access 
partners of higher status, from more technologically advanced contexts, and from a greater variety of 
foreign countries. Hence, IPR reforms allowed disadvantaged firms to enhance both the size and quality 
of their global alliance portfolios, in effect weakening the Matthew Effect as it pertains to accessing 
international alliances.  
Our research contributes to the literatures on global strategy, alliances, and institutions. Empirical 
work on whether globalization-focused institutional changes affect the relative distribution of resources 
across firms is scarce (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Yet it is central to the mission of strategy 
scholars because institutions help explain how context can shape who accrues differential advantages, 
getting at the heart of heterogeneity in competitiveness and firm performance. Our findings suggest that 
the strengthening of IPR institutions may be helpful in leveling the playing field, serving as an important 
fillip to disadvantaged firms in an economy. Further, we document an aspect of firms’ strategic activities 
that has not previously been examined in relation to IPR reforms: their external partnering. Most prior 
research has focused on how firms respond to IPR reforms via internal resource allocation, such as R&D 
investments (e.g. Branstetter et al. 2006, Vakili and McGahan 2016). Yet because collaborative 
relationships are increasingly central to firms’ global strategies, understanding the institutional 
antecedents of these relationships is increasingly important but understudied (Ahuja et al. 2012). Finally, 
in an environment in which the narrative of globalization is increasingly stressing its propensity to 
exacerbate inequality (e.g. Keller and Olney 2018), our findings offer an important counterpoint and are 
timely given the topic of this special issue. By addressing these issues, this paper offers insights useful to 
strategy scholars, managers, and policy makers. 
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BACKGROUND  
Value Creation and International Alliances 
Research has documented a range of benefits for firms that participate in international alliances, 
including knowledge acquisition, innovation, capability development, market expansion, and profitability 
(Balachandran and Hernandez 2018, Grigoriou and Rothaermel 2017, Lavie and Miller 2008). In terms of 
knowledge-related benefits, which are most germane to IPR issues, alliances that span national 
boundaries can facilitate access to knowledge and other resources that are distinct from those already 
possessed by the firm (Kogut and Zander 1993, Lavie and Miller 2008, Zaheer and Hernandez 2011). The 
meaning of knowledge and organizational practices reflects the institutional environment within which 
they are embedded, and plays a determining role in the trajectory along which knowledge evolves (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977). National institutions imprint firms with norms of behavior, as well as influencing the 
development of their search behavior in fundamental ways (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). Given differences 
in institutional environments, firms from different countries are likely to develop distinct approaches and 
routines towards problem solving and innovation—to the point where the innovation system becomes a 
distinguishing feature of nations and the economic actors within them (Nelson 1993). Partnering with a 
firm from a different country therefore brings something more unique than partnering with a firm from 
the same country, all else equal (Hitt et al. 2000). Hence, complementarities in capabilities between firms 
from different countries are an important source of value creation (Kale et al. 2002), which increases the 
motivation to form alliances (Dacin et al. 1997, Heimeriks and Duysters 2007, Mindruta et al. 2016). 
These alliances are particularly valuable to firms from emerging markets, for which there are few 
alternate avenues to access these benefits (Siegel 2007). International partnerships can be a crucial 
channel for learning, allowing these firms to gradually upgrade their knowledge and capabilities. A range 
of studies have demonstrated how international alliances can bring about these improvements for these 
firms. For instance, Alcacer and Oxley (2013) show that firms from emerging markets in the 
telecommunications handset industry substantially improved their technological capabilities via their 
OEM partnerships with foreign firms. The potential for this type of improvement has led many firms from 
emerging economies to adopt strategies focusing on ‘moving up the value curve’, which involves 
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gradually engaging in more technologically complex (and profitable) activities by learning from their 
partners (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000). In addition to facilitating learning about technology, these 
partnerships can also open up new markets where these firms can deploy the unique capabilities they 
possess (Brandl et al. 2015).  
Value Appropriation Concerns, IPR, and International Alliances 
The research mentioned so far makes a strong case for the value creation potential of alliances 
with foreign partners. Our primary interest lies in how IPR institutions affect value appropriation in such 
alliances. Despite a strong rationale for participating in international alliances, these are unlikely to be 
formed in the first place if their value creation potential is outweighed by the participants’ concerns about 
exposing their intangible assets without any assurance of capturing the value created (Dushnitsky and 
Shaver 2009, North 1990, Oxley 1999, Teece 1986). In particular, concerns stemming from inadequate 
IPR protections have become one of the most serious impediments to doing business internationally 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2004, Fang et al. 2017). This has become a particularly salient issue in 
emerging markets, which are often characterized by weaker IPR laws compared to more developed 
markets.  
Yet the extant work on firms’ responses to weak IPR emphasizes internal resource allocation 
decisions rather than its effects on external ties such as alliances. For example, Zhao (2006) demonstrated 
that the complexity and complementarity of internal linkages between technologies within the firm serve 
as a barrier to undesired knowledge spillovers in countries with weak IPR. Alcacer and Zhao (2012) 
further showed how such internal linkages allow firms to protect their IP from imitation in industry 
clusters where knowledge spillovers are likely. Other research focuses on different actions or strategies 
firms can follow to safeguard their knowledge in weak IPR settings (Agarwal et al. 2009, Schotter and 
Teagarden 2014). And some work has focused on how improvements in IPR laws affect the knowledge-
related activities of firms. For example, Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) demonstrated that 
multinational firms were more willing to transfer technological activities to their subsidiaries in the 
reforming countries. Others have focused on whether reforms increased the innovative output of firms 
from the reforming countries, showing mixed results (Lerner 2009, Qian 2007). More recently, Vakili and 
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McGahan (2016) show that firms change the focus of their R&D investments to develop capabilities that 
pertain to particular environments when the IPR protection in those environments is improved.  
However, given the appropriability concerns raised by weak IPR institutions for cross-border 
alliances, it is surprising that there is only one study on external responses to IPR (that we know of). 
Oxley (1999) showed that firms adjust the alliance governance mode (equity vs. non-equity) to the 
strength of IPR laws in their partners’ country. But research has not explored how changes in IPR 
institutions affect the ability of firms to access global alliance partners in the first place, nor looked at 
how IPR affects the quality of partners firms can access. And most crucially for our main question, prior 
work has also not addressed which firms obtain these alliance benefits as a result of IPR reforms. We 
attempt to fill these gaps in prior research. 
Status and Matthew Effects 
Research on reforms that improve the quality of formal institutions in general (not just IPR) is 
equivocal about which types of firms benefit from such improvements: some globalization-focused 
reforms appear to reinforce the preexisting advantages of the largest, most powerful firms and economic 
actors, while others seem provide benefits to a more inclusive set of actors (See Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012 for a review). Existing research on IPR reforms in particular does not address these distributional 
issues. We will first review relevant considerations from extant theories on mechanisms that may drive 
international alliance formation in a regime with weak IPR institutions vs. a regime with stronger IPR 
institutions. From these, we develop a few plausible expectations about how the value of status in the 
global alliance network may shift across the two types of regimes.  
When IPR laws (and formal institutions more generally) are weak, firms need to rely on informal 
relational mechanisms of exchange to mitigate concerns of partner misbehavior (Granovetter 1985). 
Among other mechanisms, research has shown that the status of a firm can be a significant enabler of 
exchange in these contexts (e.g. Gao et al. 2017). Status is defined as a hierarchical position in a pecking 
order, and networks are a good forum in which to observe it because high status actors sort into central 
positions and low status actors into peripheral positions (Sauder et al. 2012). Status has economic value in 
the context of interfirm relations (of which international alliances are a subset) because it is a signal of 
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unobservable firm quality and reliability as an exchange partner. Organizations can experience a loss of 
status when they engage in behavior perceived to be inappropriate (Phillips et al. 2013, Rhee and 
Haunschild 2006), so the reputational fallout from behaving badly can serve as a credible deterrent to 
opportunistic behavior by high status actors (Jensen and Roy 2008). Hence partnering with a high status 
actor can lower the risk of expropriation since the cost of behaving opportunistically goes up as status in 
the network increases (Graffin et al. 2013, Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Further, high status firms tend to 
be visible or prominent in networks, lowering the cost of searching for exchange partners. These various 
status signals are of particular value when uncertainty makes it difficult to ascertain the true quality and 
reliability of a potential partner, so that status becomes a particularly valuable means of attracting partners 
when uncertainty is high (Podolny 1994, 2001).  
While these ideas have not been empirically applied to a scenario in which one firm is 
considering an alliance with another firm from a weak IPR country, they are likely to be relevant. When 
formal IPR laws are weak, foreign firms are particularly likely to seek high status local firms to partner 
with: those that already have a degree of centrality or connections to other firms in the global alliance 
network. As just mentioned, these firms should be more visible and reputable, with status signals 
mitigating the appropriability concerns resulting from weak IPR. This results in a dynamic of partnership 
formation driven by ‘preferential attachment’: firms from weak IPR countries that are of high status (in 
the eyes of foreign partners) in one period disproportionately accrue new foreign partnerships in the next 
period (Schilling and Fang 2013).1 Over many periods, a regime dominated by preferential attachment 
leads to a highly skewed distribution of network size and quality: firms with initial status advantages have 
disproportionately larger and better networks. 
This dynamic conforms to patterns of increasing returns to centrality known as the ‘Matthew 
effect’: the rich get richer and the poor get poorer (Bothner et al. 2011, Merton 1968). Indeed, this is 
                                                          
1 Our theoretical concern is in alliances with foreign partners for two reasons. First, these are the most desirable for 
firms from emerging markets because they are the most useful to upgrade capabilities and access new markets, as 
explained earlier. Second, foreign partners are the most likely to have appropriability concerns due to weak IPR in 
the country of the focal firm because they are outsiders with little recourse to other mechanisms of protection. Other 
domestic firms are insiders that likely have developed alternative means of overcoming IPR concerns. In short, IPR 
is a greater barrier to cross-border than to domestic alliances. In additional analysis later, we will explore how IPR 
reforms affect domestic alliances as well.  
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among the most universal empirical patterns observed across a wide variety of networks (Barabási and 
Albert 1999). In our context, Matthew effects are manifested in foreign firms exhibiting a preference to 
form partnerships with firms from weak IPR regimes that are already involved in alliances. This 
preference is reinforced over time, resulting in an uneven distribution of access to global alliances that 
gives some firms resource advantages over others. Empirical studies of emerging markets are consistent 
with this dynamic, showing that a handful of firms affiliated with business groups, powerful families, or 
dominant political parties accrue most foreign partnerships and access to global markets (Gao et al. 2017, 
Khanna and Palepu 2000, Siegel 2007). 
The main question we ask is whether institutional reforms perpetuate or mitigate the Matthew 
effect as it pertains to international alliances. One the one hand, evidence from some studies of 
institutional reform would suggest a perpetuation (though none of these studies is about alliances). While 
credible reforms may generate greater interest and willingness to partner with firms from the reforming 
country, the most prominent of these firms, having prior experience with partnering and often superior 
resources, are likely to be best positioned to cater to the needs of foreign partners. For instance, research 
has shown that as institutions improve in emerging markets, the advantages enjoyed by prominent 
business groups or large firms often grow rather than shrink (e.g. Chittoor et al. 2015, Siegel and 
Choudhury 2012). More generally, prior research has shown that actors with the most social capital or the 
greatest reputation and visibility are best positioned to seize the opportunities precipitated by institutional 
reform (Aven 2013, Stiglitz 2002). Firms that are already connected to global alliance partners in these 
weak IPR economies are typically the ones that possess these qualities, and preferential attachment would 
simply reinforce their advantages when it comes to forming additional international partnerships.  
On the other hand, classic institutional theories suggest a mitigation of inequality in access to 
global alliances after IPR laws improve. The transition to stronger IPR represents a change from a regime 
dominated by interpersonal enforcement to one in which third-party enforcement is more prevalent 
(Zucker 1986). Rather than relying on cues of trustworthiness centered on the potential partner itself, 
foreign and domestic firms can now rely on an impersonal and universal platform of governance (Fang et 
al. 2017). This means that a potential foreign partner can rely on the quality and strength of the law rather 
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than solely on attributes of the focal partner. The problems of search costs and ascertaining 
trustworthiness are significantly mitigated. Consequently, foreign firms should be able to choose from a 
wider pool of potential partners. This does not imply that informal mechanisms such as status and 
reputation cease to function as means of ascertaining the quality and reliability of potential alliance 
partners—but it does mean that firms are less reliant on those informal mechanisms. Consequently, a 
greater number of firms that were previously shut out of international alliancing opportunities can access 
foreign partners.  
Given the competing theoretical possibilities, which of these outcomes plays out after 
strengthening IPR is an empirical question. Instead of presenting hypotheses, we progressively develop an 
account of the distributional effects of institutional reforms on firms in three stages. In each stage, we 
present empirical results and, informed by theory, probe the underlying mechanisms and develop 
theoretical arguments to resolve the tension. Unlike in traditional empirical papers, theoretical concepts 
will be interspersed with the empirical results and developed inductively rather than presented ex-ante. 
First, before delving into distributional effects, we establish a necessary baseline: do IPR reforms have 
any effect on the international alliance formation of the firms from the reforming country? Surprisingly, 
there is no empirical evidence of this relationship despite the importance of foreign alliances for 
emerging-market firms. Second, we get into our primary question: who benefits most from this increased 
rate of international alliance formation facilitated by IPR improvements: firms with pre-existing status 
advantages or those with previously limited opportunities due to low status? Third, we attempt to 
distinguish quantity from quality: do those firms that benefit from IPR reforms simply get more foreign 
alliance partners, but perhaps not the ‘good’ partners? Or does the reform allow them to also assemble a 
higher quality portfolio of foreign partners? 
Clearly, a firm’s ability to form partnerships is closely related to its own capabilities or quality, 
i.e. how good it is at what it does (Dyer and Singh, 1997; Kale et al., 2002). Our objective in this study is 
to examine, for a given level of resources and capabilities, how the institutional environment influences 
the ability of that firm to form partnerships, and how that change is moderated by the firm’s status. In 
other words, we hold fixed (both conceptually and empirically) the level of the firm’s actual capabilities, 
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i.e. its underlying quality or how good it is at managing alliances. As we will now describe, the design of 
our study (a diff-in-diffs with firm fixed effects) is chosen so as to enable us to hold many of the firm 
specific characteristics fixed. We will also examine changes that happen over relatively brief windows 
around the reforms to facilitate this, since it is unlikely a particular firm’s capabilities will have changed 
dramatically within these brief windows.   
DATA AND METHODS 
Our sampling frame consists of firms from thirteen countries that passed substantial and credible 
laws to strengthen patent protection during the 1990’s. We drew information about these IPR changes and 
their timing from Branstetter et al. (2006). They identify governmental interventions that lead to 
expansions or improvements in (i) eligible inventions, (ii) effective scope of patent protection, (iii) 
duration of patent protection, (iv) enforcement of patent rights and (v) administration of the patent 
system. The reforms in each of the 13 countries in our analyses exhibited improvements on at least four of 
these five dimensions. Other countries engaged in IPR reforms during this period too, but the changes in 
the law and its enforcement were not strong or credible enough to be considered meaningful. We refer the 
reader to the appendix of Branstetter et al. (2006) for an explanation of the reforms in each country. Table 
1 shows the countries in our analyses and the year of reform in each case. We further investigated the 
circumstances leading to the reforms in each of these countries, and a summary of these is presented in 
table 2. We discuss later how we deal with any empirical concerns arising from these reform processes.  
We drew information on interfirm alliances from SDC Platinum, the most comprehensive source 
of global alliances across multiple industries (Schilling 2009). Alliance data of a reasonable quality in 
SDC Platinum is only available starting in 1988. We were thus forced to drop firms from some of the 
original sixteen countries identified by Branstetter et al. (2006) because the reforms in these countries 
occurred prior to 1988: Japan (1983), South Korea (1987), Spain (1986) and Taiwan (1986). In addition 
to the remaining twelve countries in their original study, our sample also includes India (1999), which 
was identified by Branstetter et al. (2006) as passing a significant IPR reform but not included in their 
analysis as 1999 was the last year in their sample. While the IPR systems of these countries remain 
imperfect to this day, our study relies on the significance of the change rather than on them reaching an 
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ideal level. We do not assess differences in the strength or quality of reforms across countries because 
distinctions in the legal procedures and systems of countries make such comparisons infeasible—we 
focus only on whether and when there was a significant change (in a binary sense).  
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE 
Our sample includes 11,072 firms from the thirteen IPR-changing countries that participated in 
alliances between 1988 and 2004. Though our focal firms are only from the countries in which we 
observe the legal changes, their alliances could be with firms from anywhere in the world. While we 
focus on international alliances, we account for domestic alliances in all our models. Research shows that 
any type of alliance can provide a path for knowledge diffusion, and that the actual breadth of an 
alliance’s activity is typically much greater than what is formally reported as the purpose of the 
collaboration (Alcacer and Oxley 2014, Powell et al. 1996). Hence, we include alliances of all types in 
our sample. However, the results are robust to dropping alliances that have no explicitly mentioned 
knowledge component, as discussed later.   
Research Design and Estimation  
Our objective is to estimate how a firm’s cross border alliance activity changes when IPR 
institutions in its home country experience a marked improvement. The ‘treatments’ are changes in laws, 
where the treated group consists of the firms in the country that passed IPR reforms and the control group 
consists of firms from countries that did not pass reforms in the same period. We examine how the treated 
firms’ international alliance activity changes after the reforms are passed, compared to before (the first 
difference). Further, we compare these before vs. after changes with changes over the same period by 
firms whose countries had not modified their IPR laws (the second difference). This difference-in-
differences setup allows us to separate the specific effect of the reforms from broader changes occurring 
during the period (Angrist and Pischke 2008). To capture the distributional effects of these reforms, we 
explore whether there are further differences in the effect of IPR reforms across firms of different status 
(the third difference). We measure status based on a firm’s centrality, as we will describe later. 
For the estimates to be biased, the underlying data generation process would need to violate the 
parallel trends assumption, i.e. the changes in cross border alliance activity would have to be varying in 
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systematically different ways between the treatment and control groups for reasons that are unrelated to 
the IPR reforms (Bertrand et al. 2004). Since our identification relies on multiple events rather than just 
one, this systematic difference would have to be consistent and in the same direction across many events 
to bias the results. An additional factor that makes the estimation stringent is that we do not include firms 
from countries that made no IPR reforms during the sample period (say, the U.S. or Japan). The alliance 
activity of firms in these countries is likely to be systematically distinct to that of firms from the treated 
countries, which would increase the potential for selection bias. Hence, our sample only consists of firms 
from countries that made reforms over the sample period, just at different times.  
Our identification strategy therefore relies on the timing of the various IPR changes not being 
systematically endogenous to alliance activity by firms from the reforming countries. While we cannot 
perfectly verify such exogeneity, we have tried to be as thorough as possible. As Table 2 shows, the 
process leading to a reform within any given country is driven by distinct factors, some measurable and 
some not. Further, virtually all the countries reformed due to external pressures rather than internal factors 
correlated to the alliance formation decisions of local or foreign firms. These considerations make it 
unlikely that differences in the timing of IPR reforms across countries systematically coincide with 
factors endogenous to the changes in the alliance network. Nevertheless, to examine whether the changes 
in alliance activity coincide with the reforms (rather than just being part of a broader secular trend), we 
will estimate the difference in alliance activity between the treated and control groups year by year (see 
Branstetter et al. 2011 for a similar approach). We estimate the following equation: 
 
Alliancesict = βo+  β1 Post Reformct+ β2 Post Reformct*Statusict+ β3 Controlsict+ Firmi + Yeart+ εict 
where alliancesict represents an alliance outcome of interest (quantity or quality) for firm i from country c 
at time t. The variable post reformct indicates whether country c has strengthened its IPR laws as of year t. 
The coefficient of post reformct gives the difference-in-differences estimate, i.e. the average difference 
between the treated and control groups in the pre- vs. post-treatment change in international alliances. To 
explore our main question, we estimate a further specification in which we interact post reform with a 
status, as explained more later. We employ OLS regressions with firm fixed effects in all models (firmi) 
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to partial out time invariant unobserved heterogeneity between firms. These fixed effects are crucial to 
rule out the alternative explanation that central vs. peripheral firms have distinct quality or capability 
differences that justify the preferential attachment to central firms, particularly during the pre-reform 
regime. We also include year fixed effects (yeart) to account for macroeconomic effects that may cause 
fluctuations in global alliance activity. All our models contain the controls summarized in table 3.  
Table 4 shows the summary statistics and correlations for the variables involved in the 
estimation. Note that the mean of new international alliances is very low (0.05), and is also highly skewed 
(s.d. of 0.2). This is not too surprising, since this variable is the mean of the number of new international 
alliances formed per firm-year across all the firms in the sample and the entire study period. Furthermore, 
the skewness confirms the fact that a relatively small proportion of these firms are likely to be responsible 
for a lot of the alliance activity. We will log this variable in our linear models, and also present it broken 
down in different ways by period and by country throughout our analysis.   
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE 
RESULTS 
1. Baseline: Effect of IPR Reforms on International Alliance Formation 
Based on canonical institutional theory (Teece, 1986; Zucker, 1986; North, 1990; Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2012), we would expect that firms establish more alliances with international partners after IPR 
reforms in their countries. The conceptual explanation is simple: an improved appropriability regime 
allays the IP loss concerns of foreign partners (Teece, 1986), making firms from the reforming country 
relatively more attractive than before. However, this important effect on alliances has not been 
documented previously. With the exception of Oxley (1999), who assessed the effects of IPR strength on 
alliance governance mode choice, prior research has largely focused on how firms adjust their internal 
activities in response to the strengthening of IPR protection (e.g. Vakili and McGahan 2016; Branstetter 
et al., 2006; 2011). Documenting the main effect of IPR reforms on the international alliance formation of 
firms in the reforming countries is thus a necessary first step to later explore the distributional effects of 
IPR on access to international alliances. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
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 We start by examining the raw data for any trends in international alliance formation around the 
reforms. Table 5 shows the average number of new international alliances formed by the firms from each 
country in the three-year windows before and after the reforms. We see that this number goes up in each 
case except that of the Philippines. Next, we statistically test this in a regression model including a range 
of controls as well as firm and year fixed effects. We measure international alliances as the natural log of 
one plus the number of new alliances that the focal firm establishes in a given year with partners that are 
based in a country different than its own, as classified by SDC’s alliance participant location. We add one 
to the original count for logging purposes because many firms do not form ties every year. Model 1 of 
table 6 shows the estimate of the difference-in-differences in the post reform variable. The positive and 
significant coefficient (p<0.01) indicates that IPR reforms are associated with an increase in the rate of 
international alliance formation. The partial elasticity, holding other variables at their mean, reveals that 
IPR reforms increased international alliances by 45% for the treated group compared to the change over 
the same time period for the control group.  
INSERT TABLE 6 AND FIGURE 1 HERE 
Mechanisms driving the main effect. One potential alternative explanation for the main effect 
of IPR reforms on international alliances may be that the reforms proxy for a general process of 
globalization and liberalization (this was the time of the Washington consensus), and therefore the 
underlying mechanism may not have anything specifically to do with the IPR laws per se. If that were the 
case, we would observe the increase in international alliances as a secular trend, regardless of when or 
whether these laws were passed. Note that we controlled for several indicators of globalization: an 
indicator of liberalization, a measure of capital flow openness, and a count of reforms enacted by 
neighboring countries (see table 3). Also, as table 2 shows, IPR reforms in each of our sample countries 
displayed substantial idiosyncrasies and it was not the case that these coincided precisely with other 
liberalizing reforms in each country.  
Nevertheless, to verify if the IPR laws were driving the observed changes we break down the 
difference-in-differences estimate by year. This allows us to observe the difference in international 
alliances between the treated and control groups in the years leading up to and following the reforms. In 
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Model 2, we break down post-reform into a series of year-by-year indicators, with the year before the 
reform (reform(t-1)) as the baseline. The coefficients of these indicators are plotted in figure 1 (with 
vertical lines indicating the 95% confidence intervals). We observe a clear jump in the coefficient 
corresponding with the year of the reforms. The rate at which firms form international alliances is then 
largely sustained at this higher level well into the future.2 These yearly results significantly strengthen our 
ability to infer that the observed changes are caused by the IPR reforms. We observe no pre-trend, i.e. the 
rate of international alliance formation was not steadily increasing in the years leading up to the reforms. 
And the ‘jump’ corresponds precisely with the year of the reforms. It is unlikely that alternative factors 
driving international alliance formation would also correspond so precisely in time with the law changes 
across thirteen different countries. This test offers us confidence that the results we observe are have 
something to do with the strengthening of IPR protections. Even if other liberalizing institutional changes 
were occurring over roughly the same period, it is extremely unlikely that these coincided precisely with 
the IPR law changes across all of these different countries in such a way as to be responsible for the 
substantial ‘jump’ we see exactly at the time when these law changes occurred.  
As a further test of this, we also probed whether the baseline results are driven by knowledge-
related mechanisms, as we would expect if the effects are a product of easing concerns regarding IP 
appropriability. If this were the case, the increase in international alliances should be most pronounced for 
firms in industries where IP-related concerns are greatest. Since the laws in our sample were related to 
patent protection, we estimate a ‘triple difference’ (a difference in the difference-in-differences) between 
firms in patent intensive and non-patent intensive industries. We interacted the post reform variable with a 
binary indicator of patent intensity, which takes the value of 1 if the firm in in a patent intensive industry, 
and 0 otherwise, as defined by the US patent and trademark office (USPTO 2012). Model 3 of table 7 
shows these estimates. We observe a positive and significant coefficient of the triple difference term 
(p<0.05). The positive effect of IPR reforms on the rate of international alliance formation is more 
pronounced for firms in patent intensive industries—approximately 35% greater than that experienced by 
                                                          
2 Note that the post-reform yearly coefficients need not be significant in every year to conclude that IPR reforms 
caused a significant increase in international alliances. The timing and the overall pattern are more important, as 
there will be natural variability across individual years (Wooldridge 2010). 
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firms from non-patent-intensive industries. It is less plausible that this distinction between firms in patent 
intensive and non-patent intensive industries would exist if they were being driven by other events 
unrelated to IPR protection.  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
In combination, the results so far demonstrate that IPR reforms had an important effect on the 
opportunity of firms from the reforming countries to access international partners. This is a significant 
result given the demonstrated value of these cross-border partnerships for capability development and 
innovation (e.g. Grigoriou and Rothaermel 2017; Balachandran and Hernandez 2018). It is also important 
given that prior research has found that in many cases these laws do not elicit the internal resource 
allocation changes they were intended to (e.g. Kyle and McGahan 2012). The fact that these reforms 
facilitate benefits in terms of interfirm partnerships is therefore an important and, to the best of our 
knowledge, thus far undocumented result.  
2. Who Benefits from IPR Reforms? 
While the results thus far show an average increase in alliance formation, we still have a limited 
understanding of which firms are most likely to accrue this increase. An important question is whether 
these increases are driven by a growth in the number of alliances per firm or a growth in the number of 
firms forming alliances, or indeed both of these. To probe this, we will first examine some descriptive 
statistics. Table 8 shows the average number of new international alliances formed by the firms that 
formed at least one international alliance in the pre and post reform periods, in the three-year window 
around the reforms. The uniform increases we observe here suggest that there was a widespread increase 
in the number of alliances formed by the firms that were already participating in international alliances. 
Table 9 shows the number of firms from each country in our sample that form international alliances in 
the three-year windows before and after the reforms. The increases we see across the board in this table 
suggest that the reform also had the effect of broadening the base of participating firms.3 On average, 
across the countries in the sample only 9.4% of firms had at least one foreign alliance partner in the three 
                                                          
3 The increase in the number of firms is particularly stark in China. As described later, the results hold if we drop 
Chinese firms from the sample. 
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years leading up to the reform. In contrast, 26.6% of the firms in the average country had one or more 
foreign partners post-reform. A t-test shows that this increase is statistically significant (p < 0.01). While 
only indicative, this is a powerful clue that the distribution of international alliancing opportunities 
became much more even across firms within countries. In combination, these figures suggest that the 
effects of the reforms were reflected in an increase in both the intensive margin (number of alliances 
formed) as well as the extensive margin (number of firms forming alliances). We will now focus our 
attention on the latter because we are interested in understanding whether the benefits associated with the 
reforms principally accrue to the most prominent firms in the economy or whether they are more 
equitably distributed. 
INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 HERE 
We turn to results at the firm level to more systematically explore this question. Our primary test 
is based on a measure of the firm’s status in the global alliance network, based on the well-documented 
benefits of preferential attachment we discussed earlier. Drawing on prior research, we capture a firm’s 
status in each year using its eigenvector centrality, which is a measure that weights each of the firm’s ties 
by the centrality of the actor to which it is associated (Bonacich 1987, Sauder et al. 2012). This is the 
most frequently used indicator of status because it accounts not just for how extensively connected a firm 
is, but also the connectedness of its partners (e.g. Podolny 1994, 2001, Bothner et al. 2011). We will 
interact eigenvector centrality in the year prior to the reform with the post reform indicator to examine if 
the effect of the reforms on international alliances increases or decreases with a firm’s pre-reform 
centrality. In addition to being a good indicator of a firm’s position of advantage in the pre-IPR reform 
regime, measuring centrality before the reform (but not afterward) has an empirical advantage. A firm’s 
centrality may be affected by the reform; so measuring centrality year-by-year after the reform can lead to 
biased estimates due to the “bad control” problem (Angrist and Pischke 2008). To avoid this, and because 
it better captures our conceptual interest, we measure centrality in the year preceding the reform and 
interact it with the post reform indicator.  
INSERT TABLES 10 AND 11 HERE 
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Model 4 of table 10 shows these results. Note that we cannot estimate a direct effect of 
eigenvector centrality on international alliances because it has a single value for each firm (the value from 
the year prior to the reform) and is therefore collinear with the firm fixed effects. However, we can 
estimate its interaction with post reform. The coefficient of this interaction term is negative and 
significant (p<0.001): the positive effect of the reforms on international alliances is more pronounced for 
firms that were of lower centrality prior to the reforms. The substantive significance of these coefficients 
is somewhat tricky to interpret given that centrality values are time-invariant. But an approximation 
indicates that the effect of IPR reforms on international alliance formation is about 40% lower for firms 
with eigenvector centrality one-standard deviation above the mean in the pre-reform period. These results 
suggest that IPR reforms bring about a softening of the Matthew effect. In other words, the reforms serve 
to diminish the degree to which a firm’s status predicts its future international alliance formation.   
Alternative measure of initial advantage. Firm status is our preferred indicator of initial 
advantage because it relates directly to the ability to obtain international alliances. Nevertheless, we want 
to examine whether the basic mechanism we are proposing, i.e. that the benefits of the reforms favor 
those firms that were peripheral in the pre-reform regime hold using a different conceptualization of 
initial advantage altogether. As an additional measure of this, we look at whether the firm is located in the 
political or financial capital of the reforming country. Being located in the most prominent cities in the 
economy can be advantageous in terms of visibility to foreign partners since these cities tend to be the 
best connected to the outside world (Parnreiter 2017). In addition, these locations may also make it easier 
to access valuable resources—ideas, production inputs, social and political capital—which can be 
valuable in facilitating access to foreign partners (Nanda and Khanna 2010). In contrast, being located in 
a more provincial part of the country can be a disadvantage in these respects. Firms in smaller cities may 
be both harder to find, and in a regime viewed as having weak institutions the location of the firm may 
also be used as a heuristic for its quality or reliability (Porter and Stern 2001). In short, location in a 
political or economic capital could be another driver of preferential attachment—albeit less because of the 
firm’s status or reputation and more because of indirect attributions made about the firm. We will 
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therefore examine how the effect of the reforms differs for firms located in the prominent cities compared 
to firms located elsewhere.  
To carry out this analysis, we first obtained data on the location of the firms in the reforming 
countries (the ‘participant location’ in SDC Platinum). This information is only available for roughly 50% 
of the firms in our sample. Subsequently, we identified the political and commercial capitals for each of 
the countries in our sample. For most countries, the same city serves as both the political and commercial 
center of the country (e.g. Buenos Aires in Argentina). The exceptions are India, China, and Brazil. Table 
11 shows the cities classified as ‘capitals’ in each of the countries in our sample. We define the variable 
major city as being equal to 1 if the firm is located in one of these cities and 0 otherwise.  
Model 5 of table 10 shows the baseline (main effect) result for the subsample of firms for which 
we have location data. The results are not materially altered from those in model 1. In model 6 we 
introduce the interaction of major city with the post reform indicator, which has a negative and significant 
coefficient (p<0.01). This indicates that the alliance-enhancing benefits of the reforms are more 
pronounced for firms located outside major cities, in line with the narrative supported by our previous 
results: institutional improvements disproportionately helped initially disadvantaged firms access 
international partnerships.  
3. Quality vs. Quantity of International Alliances 
So far, we have shown that IPR reforms allow firms from reforming countries to access more 
international partners, and that this benefit is particularly pronounced for firms that were in a less 
advantageous position to access these alliances in the pre-reform regime. But a greater number/quantity of 
foreign partners may not equate to improved quality in firms’ alliance portfolios. If previously 
disadvantaged firms simply get more of the ‘bad’ partnerships due to adverse selection, perhaps IPR 
reforms are not as helpful in leveling the playing field as we have suggested. We thus focus our analysis 
on assessing if reforms help improve firms’ alliance portfolio quality and, if they do, who obtains such a 
benefit. 
Technological Sophistication of Partner Country: As we outlined previously, a significant part 
of the benefits from international alliances arise from being able to update their technological capabilities 
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by learning from their partners (Alcacer and Oxley 2013). This benefit would only be realized if the 
increase in the rate of alliance formation we observe (especially among the previously disadvantaged 
firms) also incorporates more partnering with firms with better knowledge resources. We will use two 
different variables to proxy for technological sophistication, both based on the characteristics of the 
partners’ countries. First, we will use the volume of high technology exports made by the partner country 
as of the year in which the partnership is formed. As an alternative, we will use the number of articles in 
science and technology journals published by individuals located in these countries. We obtain data for 
both these measures from the World Bank’s country indicators database.  
Models 7 and 8 of table 12 show the results using the average high technology exports (measures 
in billions of USD) of the firm’s partners’ countries. Model 7 shows that the reforms bring about an 
increase in this measure of about $1.9B USD (p<0.001). In model 8, we see from the interaction term that 
this increase is lower as the eigenvector pre-reform centrality of the firm increases (p<0.001). Models 9 
and 10 show the analogous results using the average number of science and technology journal articles 
authored by individuals from the firm’s partner country (in hundreds). We observe a positive and 
significant effect of the reforms on average, but one that is most pronounced for firms that were 
peripheral prior to the reforms (p<0.001 in both cases).  In combination, these results support the idea that 
the reforms served to level the playing field in terms of the quality of international partners that the firms 
from the reforming country were able to access.  
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
Partner Status: A second measure of quality we employ is based on the status of the foreign 
partner. One possibility may be that the high-status domestic firms continue to accrue partnerships to the 
high-status foreign firms after the reforms, while peripheral firms can only ally with the lower status 
foreign partners. To test whether this is the case, we formulate a DV based on partner status, measured as 
the average eigenvector centrality of the focal firm’s partners as of the focal year. We then test how this 
measure is affected by the reforms, and whether the change in this measure brought about by the reforms 
varies depending on the status of the firms from the reforming country. Models 11 and 12 of table 12 
show these results. We observe that the average effect of the reforms on partner status is positive and 
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significant (p = 0.057). On average, the reforms are associated with a 27% increase in partner status for 
firms from the reforming country. Furthermore, the increase in partner status is significantly more 
pronounced for firms from the reforming country that were of low status pre-reform (p<0.001).  
International Diversity of Alliance Partners. As a final indicator of quality, we focus on the 
international diversity of firms’ alliance portfolios. Exposure to partners from distinct national 
jurisdictions is a source of resource and knowledge diversity. The persistent differences across countries 
along many dimensions—institutional, cultural, or economic—create pockets of idiosyncratic knowledge, 
technologies, practices, and other resources. Countries have unique national innovation systems (Nelson 
1993), and firms with alliances that span various countries derive greater innovation, profitability, and 
other types of performance benefits (Balachandran and Hernandez 2018, Vasudeva et al. 2013). To 
examine this, we generate partner diversity, which captures the degree to which a firm’s partners are 
dispersed across countries. The measure is based on a Herfindahl index and is defined as 1 - ∑i si2 where si 
is the fraction of the firm’s partners that are from country i. High values of this measure indicate that a 
firm’s partners are spread out geographically whereas low values indicate that they are concentrated in 
fewer countries.  
Models 13 and 14 of table 12 show the results of our analyses using partner diversity as the 
dependent variable. The reforms bring about an increase in the diversity of partners for firms from the 
reforming country (p<0.05). The magnitude is substantial: the partial elasticity, holding other variables at 
their means, suggests that partner diversity increases by about 44% after the reforms for the treated firms 
compared to the control group. But most germane to our interest in Matthew effects, Model 14 shows that 
the increase in diversity of partners is most pronounced for firms that were of lower centrality in the 
alliance network prior to the reforms (p<0.001). 
Type of Alliance. So far we have not distinguished among different types of alliances because 
any international partnership can involve exchanges of IP and knowledge that are valuable for firms from 
emerging economies, even if the alliance does not explicitly state a knowledge-related objective (Alcacer 
and Oxley 2014, Schilling and Phelps 2007). However, it may be that alliances classified as having more 
explicit knowledge-related components are more desirable or of better quality than other types, 
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particularly for firms from emerging economies seeking to upgrade their capabilities. As a first step 
towards getting at this, we estimated the results after dropping alliances whose description in SDC 
Platinum appears to be the least likely to involve knowledge exchange (e.g. retail and wholesale, financial 
services, advertising, shipping, etc.). This removed about 30% of the alliances in our sample. The results 
using only the remaining ‘knowledge’ alliances are summarized in models 15 and 16 of table 13. The IPR 
reforms continue to exhibit a positive effect on the formation of international knowledge alliances and the 
benefit is strongest for firms that were peripheral in the pre-reform period. 
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE 
We probed further into specific alliance types by partitioning the ‘knowledge’ alliances formed 
by firms into specific types. The most common alliance type in our sample, as classified by SDC, is 
‘manufacturing’, which composes 40% of the total sample (knowledge plus non-knowledge). ‘Marketing’ 
alliances make up 18%, whereas ‘R&D’ alliances make up around 5% of the sample. It could be that 
some alliance types are more desirable than others. For instance, R&D collaborations may help firms 
develop new technologies to upgrade capabilities, or marketing alliances may help firms learn how to 
manage valuable brands. If central firms disproportionately gain one or more of these desirable alliances 
post IPR reform, the playing field may not be leveled as much as our narrative suggests. To explore this, 
we re-ran our analysis using separate counts of the three alliance types as dependent variables.  
The results are shown in models 17-22 of table 13. In terms of the main effect of post reform, we 
find that the rate at which firms establish manufacturing and marketing alliances increases significantly 
following reforms. We find no main effect of post reform in the case of R&D alliances. Most importantly, 
however, we observe firms that with lower centrality in the network prior to the reforms establish 
significantly more of each of the three alliance types post-reform compared to firms with higher centrality 
pre-reform. This conforms to our prior that any kind of international alliance can be beneficial (for 
different reasons), and also validates the narrative that IPR reforms allow firms with initial disadvantages 
to improve both the quantity and quality of their alliance portfolios.  
Domestic Alliances  
 23 
The focus of this paper is on how reforms that strengthen IPR affect the ability of firms from the 
reforming country to form international partnerships. As we have argued, this is interesting and 
exceedingly important given the value of international partnerships for firms from emerging economies. 
However, a related question that can also help us understand more about the way these reforms work is 
whether and how they affect domestic partnering behavior among firms from the reforming country. 
While IPR concerns are still likely to play some role, these are likely to be less pronounced than in the 
case of international alliances given that firms within these countries have developed their knowledge 
assets within the same environments in which they are forming alliances and that all firms are subject to 
the same institutional limitations. Also, these firms may have developed alternative means of protecting 
their IP that are well suited to their home environments. We examine this using an identical setup to our 
preceding analyses in table 14, except that the dependent variable is now the count of domestic alliances. 
Model 23 shows the average effect of the reforms on new domestic alliances. We observe a positive 
coefficient on the post reform variable, though it is only statistically significant at the p < 0.1 level. 
Hence, we have some evidence that the reforms have a positive, though noisy, effect on domestic alliance 
formation.  
INSERT TABLE 14 HERE 
To probe this further, we make a distinction that is particularly important to our question: whether 
the domestic alliance is with a locally owned firm vs, with the local affiliate of a foreign firm (partially or 
fully owned, though we do not know the ownership level). Of the firms in our sample, 9% belong to this 
category, i.e. their ‘ultimate parent’ as classified by SDC is from a different country.4 We break down the 
‘domestic alliances’ count into two parts—alliances with affiliates of foreign firms, and alliances with 
other local firms. The results using each of these as the DV are shown in models 25 and 27, respectively. 
While the reforms have a positive and significant effect on the number of domestic alliances with foreign 
                                                          
4 This may provoke the question of whether affiliates of foreign firms should be counted as part of international 
alliances, or whether they should be included in our data at all. As mentioned, these firms only compose a relatively 
small part of our sample. We re-ran all our analyses after trying both (counting ties to affiliates as international 
alliances, and dropping affiliates from the data) and found all our estimates to be materially unaltered, both in terms 
of magnitude and statistical significance. 
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subsidiaries (p<0.01), we observe no effect in relation to domestic alliances with other local firms. This 
suggests that the effect we observed on domestic alliances in aggregate is driven primarily by affiliates of 
foreign firms. It is also in line with our earlier expectation that foreign firms are the most sensitive to 
changes in these formal institutions, whereas local firms are likely to have developed alternative means of 
assurance that are well suited to their home environments.  
We also examine how the main effect of IPR reforms on domestic alliances varies based on the 
status of the firm. Interestingly, we find no significant interaction effect regardless of whether the 
dependent variable is aggregate domestic alliances (model 24), alliances with local affiliates of foreign 
firms (model 26), or alliances with purely local firms (model 28). The lack of a status effects for domestic 
alliances suggests that status-based assurance mechanisms are not as relevant when indigenous firms ally 
with each other. This could happen because local firms develop alternative informal means of reducing 
transaction hazards that are customized to their native environments. In any case, these findings validate 
our choice to focus on international alliances when studying the impact of IPR on Matthew effects in 
alliance networks.   
Additional Considerations and Robustness Tests    
We considered a variety of alternative specifications to address potential sources of bias. We ran 
additional tests to ensure that our findings are not sensitive to measurement choices. In our primary 
models, we logged the count of international alliances to improve the linear fit. We ran other models 
using the non-logged measure and the results were similar (see model 29 and 30 in table 15). Instead of 
measuring eigenvector centrality in the year before the passage of the laws, we used measures from 2 and 
3 years before and the results were robust (results available from the authors). We also included country-
year fixed effects rather than year fixed effects in the models with triple differences (country-year 
dummies are collinear with the post reform indicator and therefore cannot be used in the other models) 
and the results were materially unchanged. Given the correlation between domestic alliances and 
international alliances, we dropped the former as a control variable from all the models and found our 
results to be materially unaltered.   
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We also carried out various tests to ensure that our findings were not driven by a particular subset 
of the observations in the sample. We replicated all our analyses after separately dropping firms from the 
two largest countries in our sample, China and India, and the results were not materially altered (see 
models 31 – 34 in table 15). Indeed, our results were robust to dropping the firms from any individual 
country. As table 2 shows, pressure from the United States government appears to have played an 
important role in driving several of the IPR reforms. If U.S. firms were instrumental in bringing about this 
pressure, in part to further their interests though alliances with firms from the reforming markets, the 
increased alliance formation could be endogenous to the timing of the legal changes. To rule this out, we 
recalculated the international alliances variable to include ties to firms from every foreign country except 
the United States. The results remained materially unaltered (models 35 and 36 of table 15).  
In addition, to rule out the concern that the results are driven by a small set of firms that are very 
active in alliance formation, we dropped the 10% of firms in each country that form the most alliances 
over the sample period. We did not find any material differences in the results due to these changes 
(results available from the authors).  
INSERT TABLE 15 HERE 
Despite the robustness of the results, our approach has limitations. Regulatory changes do not 
occur in isolation: they are often accompanied by other events that could make the climate in the country 
more favorable for foreign firms or increase exposure to global collaboration in general. Despite our 
efforts to account for a myriad of issues unrelated to IPR (see Table 2 and the year-by-year estimates), the 
effects we find could still be influenced by unobserved factors. But the fact that we observe no pre-trends 
and that changes in firms’ alliance coincide with the years in which laws are passed alleviates the concern 
of reverse causality, i.e. the possibility that increased alliance activity could somehow be driving the 
passage of the laws. The observed effects could still be consistent with firms ‘preparing the groundwork’ 
for international ties in anticipation of IPR changes and then signing alliance contracts as soon as the laws 
are passed. If that were the case, it still underscores the importance of actual reform as the source of the 
effect because it shows that firms do not establish ties until better formal institutions are in place. 
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DISCUSSION 
Institutional reforms can profoundly alter the competitive positions of firms. Yet there has been 
limited research on which firms benefit most from these reforms: are the opportunities they create seized 
primarily by the most prominent firms, thus perpetuating Matthew effects; or by previously peripheral 
firms, thus leveling the playing field? This forms the overarching motivation for this study, which 
examines how the strengthening of IPR laws affects the distribution of access to international partnerships 
among the firms in the reforming country. Specifically, we investigate whether the international 
alliancing benefits of IPR reforms are predominantly captured by central firms or whether they accrue to 
firms that were peripheral during the pre-reform regime. We find that institutional improvements lead to a 
democratization in foreign alliance opportunities, by disproportionately enhancing the quantity and the 
quality of the global alliance portfolios of firms that had limited access to the global network of alliances 
before the reforms.  
Figure 2 depicts an example from our data that illustrates our findings. The figure shows the 
alliances of two firms from Thailand before and after the 1992 IPR reforms in that country. One of these 
firms, the C.P. Group, was and still is the most prominent business group in the country, whereas the 
other, Shin Corporation, was a much younger and less prominent firm at the time. The alliances in the 
pre-reform period reflect this, with Shin having only two partnerships with other Thai firms, whereas the 
C.P. Group had several international partnerships. Following the IPR reform, both firms increased their 
number of international alliances. However, the difference is most marked for Shin, which was able to 
access many foreign partners and participate in the global alliance networks for the first time. Further, 
Shin was able to assemble a much more globally diversify portfolio of alliance partners, whereas C.P. 
Group exhibited a much less drastic change in alliance partner diversity. Note that C.P. was not 
necessarily harmed by the IPR reform—it was simply that the inequality in the size and quality of its 
global alliance portfolio relative to Shin diminished.  
This suggests that the distributional benefits of IPR reforms do not come from taking away from 
the advantaged firms but rather from elevating the ones that were previously prevented from participating. 
Our findings in tables 8 and 9, as well as the fact that the rate of participation in foreign alliances jumped 
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from 9.4% to 26.6%, is consistent with the conclusion that the benefit to the weak came through enhanced 
access for all firms rather than from taking away from those with pre-existing advantages. These findings 
go against the current narrative that globalization-focused reforms that open an economy to international 
exchange are detrimental to local firms on average, particularly the weaker ones. Of course, we capture 
benefits in a relatively narrow sense by focusing on alliances, and we lack data to assess the effects of 
reforms on the financial performance of firms. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Before the empirical analysis, we developed competing empirical expectations. On the one hand, 
the concept of preferential attachment would suggest that central firms would benefit the most from IPR 
reforms. On the other hand, classic institutional theories would suggest that peripheral firms would see 
enhanced opportunities to participate in the global alliance network thanks to IPR improvements. We did 
not offer a theoretical resolution ex-ante, but with the benefit of a consistent pattern of empirical results 
we now offer a potential explanation. The core of our answer has to do with the scalability of informal 
(relational) vs. formal (legal) institutions. Prior literature has tended to ask whether these different types 
of mechanisms (formal or relational) are effective at the dyadic level (e.g. Poppo and Zenger 2002). In 
other words, do they facilitate collaboration between a particular pair of partners? The answer of prior 
work, by and large, is that both mechanisms work at the dyadic level—that is, they can both reduce 
appropriability concerns.  
But we address a different issue: What are the implications of these two different modes of 
governing interfirm alliances for the preferential attachment mechanism that leads to Matthew effects? 
Note that this is not a functional question (do the governance modes work?), but a distributional one (how 
to they affect the relative distribution of partnering opportunities?). In terms of that question, formal vs. 
informal governance are not equivalent. While effective to govern individual dyads, informal governance 
is inherently hard to port across many alliances or partners. For example, the status of a specific local firm 
with which a foreign firm wishes to partner cannot transfer to another local firm. Similarly, the trust 
developed over time with a specific partner (another informal governance mechanism) does not apply to a 
different partner. This lack of portability places a ceiling on the number of international alliance partners 
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that a firm can access based on relational governance mechanisms. At an aggregate level, this is 
manifested in an unequal distribution of access to foreign partners because only a few firms can develop 
distinctive attributes such as status—as the Mathew effect predicts. In contrast, formal institutions (e.g. 
IPR laws) are by design meant to offer a universally applicable platform to govern collaborations within a 
jurisdiction. Hence, transitions to significantly stronger IPR laws allow for much wider participation in 
alliances for firms from the reforming jurisdiction. Now, a foreign firm wishing to partner with a local 
firm does not need to screen only for a select few that have ‘relational’ attributes such as status. This 
permits more value-creating partnerships to form, and results in the more equitable distribution we 
document in this study. We believe this is a relatively novel theoretical explanation, and that it offers an 
intriguing link between institutions and the widely documented phenomenon of the Matthew effect in 
interfirm networks. 
The other major finding of this study is that IPR changes also allow firms—particularly 
peripheral ones—to increase the quality of the firms in their alliance portfolios. The results show quality 
improvements along three dimensions: technological capability, network status, and diversity. Prior 
research shows each of these to be valuable benefits from participation in alliances. In the first case, 
studies demonstrate that partnerships with technologically stronger firms are crucial means of upgrading 
technological capabilities for firms. This is especially the case for firms from emerging markets (Alcacer 
and Oxley, 2014). In the literature on network structure, being able to partner with other firms of high 
status is the means by which a focal firm’s status increases. In a circular way, the status of a firm’s 
partners reflects upon the focal actor, enhancing its status and thus leading to several documented benefits 
(e.g. revenues, funding, etc.) (Podolny, 2001; Stuart et al. 1999). Finally, alliance partner diversity is one 
of the most commonly referenced motives for cross-national collaboration, particularly those involving 
R&D or other knowledge activities (Lavie and Miller 2008, Penner-Hahn and Shaver 2005). Diversity of 
national backgrounds is valuable because it is an ingredient in the process of recombination of ideas 
central to innovation (Fleming, 2001; Balachandran and Hernandez, 2018). Our contribution is to show 
that institutions are precursors to these known benefits from participating in cross-border alliances.   
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Our study is not without limitations. Because we do not have much data on the firms in the 
sample, we are unable to examine outcomes such as financial performance, or other indicators of 
advantage or prominence used in prior literature such as affiliation to a business group or political 
connections (Khanna and Palepu 2000, Siegel 2007). Another mechanism we are unable to observe, due 
to lack of data, is whether the increase in alliances we observe is driven by foreign firms switching 
governance modes due IPR improvements, for instance from wholly owned subsidiaries to alliances (e.g. 
Oxley 1999). Also, it may be the case that limits to the number of alliances that high-status firms can 
handle naturally drive some of the foreign partners towards allying with low-status firms. This 
mechanism is still consistent with our reasoning, because partnerships with low-status firms are only 
observed after IPR improvements. However, we are unable to distinguish this precisely in our data.    
We are limited in our ability to delve into the variance in IPR reforms across countries. This 
variance exists along two dimensions. One is the strength or quality of reform. Exploring it would allow 
scholars to assess if there are thresholds of reform strength necessary for the effects we observe to 
manifest. A second dimension of variance comes from the different motivations countries have to reform 
IPR. While Table 2 summarizes some of those, in our sample we lacked sufficient variance across only 13 
countries to explore this. It could be that some motivations are more credible than others, or that different 
motivations lead to distinct outcomes for alliance formation. Finally, though we are seeking to broadly 
highlight the importance of institutional changes on firms’ strategic decisions and outcomes, as well as 
the paucity of research on these topics, the scope of our study covers only a particular type of institutional 
change: the strengthening of IPR protections. We hope future research will be able to examine whether 
similar mechanisms operate with respect to other kinds of institutional reforms.  
This study identifies important consequences of institutional improvements in IPR, namely that 
they facilitate improved access to and quality of international alliances for firms from the reforming 
country—particularly for those that were previously disadvantaged in accessing foreign partners. Given 
the increasing importance of collaborative arrangements between firms in the global economy, and the 
growing chorus of concerns about the distributional effects of globalization, these findings are noteworthy 
for those with an interest in global strategy, institutions, and international exchange.   
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: Effects of IPR reforms on the number of international alliances (Model 2) 
 
Graph shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients associated with the corresponding 
variable in model 2 of table 5. Variables indicate the specific year in relation to the year of reform. ‘t-1’ is the omitted 
year. DV is log of 1 + the number of international alliances formed by the firm in a given year 
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Figure 2: Example of Effect of IPR Reforms on International Alliance Formation 
 
Table 1: Countries in sample and year of reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Year of reform 
Argentina 1996 
Brazil 1997 
Chile 1991 
China 1993 
Colombia 1994 
India 1999 
Indonesia 1991 
Mexico 1991 
Philippines 1997 
Portugal 1992 
Thailand 1992 
Turkey 1995 
Venezuela 1994 
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Table 2: Process Leading to IPR Reforms in Different Countries 
Path to Reform Issue Description Empirical Implications 
Pressure from 
the U.S. 
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) placed 
some countries on its “priority watch list” and 
threatened to impose trade sanctions if they 
did not reform IP laws (e.g. China, Indonesia, 
Mexico). The U.S. also made IP reform a 
precondition for negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements (Chile and Mexico in late 1980’s). 
Typically, countries gave the U.S. a credible 
signal that they would modify their laws and 
were dropped from the watch list. Actual 
reforms became effective 1-3 years after the 
initial intent to reform. 
 
Sources: Platikanova-Gross 2006, Yu 2001, 
Kusumadara 2000, Goldstein & Strauss 2009, 
Hufbauer & Schott 1992, Baca 1994, Shadlen 
2009 
1) If U.S. pressure instead of actual IPR reform 
drives the effects, we should observe a pre-
reform trend by which network changes occur 
in the window between U.S. pressure and 
actual IPR reform.  
 
2) Changes in global network participation 
could be driven only by alliances with U.S. 
firms, not from ties to firms from other foreign 
countries. 
 
SOLUTION: 1) We observe year-by-year trends 
leading up to the actual IPR reform and find no 
pre-trends. 2) We drop U.S. firms as potential 
international partners and the results remain 
consistent. 
Compliance with 
TRIPS to enter 
the WTO 
When it became clear that compliance with 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) would be required to 
join the WTO in the early 1990’s, some 
countries demonstrated willingness to reform 
IPR relatively quickly but the legal changes 
weren’t always immediate. Turkey signed the 
WTO agreement in 1994 and reformed IP in 
1995. The Philippines was open to IP reform 
but the circuitous legislative process delayed 
the law until 1997. 
 
Sources: Goldstein & Strauss 2009; Ozkan 
2010 
 
If the intent to comply with TRIPS instead of 
actual IPR reform drives the effects, we should 
observe a pre-reform trend by which network 
changes occur in the window between 
expressed intent and the passage of the law. 
 
SOLUTION: We observe year-by-year trends 
leading up to the actual IPR reform and find no 
pre-trends. 
Broad neo-
liberalization 
during the 
1980’s and 
1990’s 
The 1980’s and 1990’s were a period of 
significant economic liberalization across the 
world. Many developing countries adopted 
several of the reforms suggested by the 
Washington Consensus. Reforms focused on 
fiscal policy, tax reform, trade liberalization, 
and deregulation. While property rights were 
considered part of the reform package, IPR 
tended to be part of a later, “second wave” of 
liberalization that came 5-10 years after the 
first set of neoliberal reforms.  
 
Sources: Fukuyama 1992, Williamson 2000, 
Helfer et al. 2009 
Broad neo-liberalization could be confounding 
the effects of IP-specific reforms in our study. 
The effects we observe could be driven by a 
more general opening of these countries to 
foreign exchange, which is unrelated to IP or 
knowledge mechanisms. 
 
SOLUTION: We control for trade neo-
liberalization (Wacziarg & Welch 2003) and 
openness to capital flows (Quinn & Toyoda 
2008) as well as a host of country-level 
indicators such as FDI inflows, exports, 
infrastructure changes, etc. 
Compliance with 
regional treaties 
Some countries reformed in unison as part of a 
regional agreement. For example, Colombia 
and Venezuela reformed IPR as part of the 
Andean Community while Portugal reformed 
If the expectation of reform instead of actual 
IPR reform drives the effects, we should 
observe a pre-reform trend by which network 
changes occur in the window between 
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to comply with the expectations of the 
European Single Market. In both cases the 
regional agreement to reform preceded actual 
reform by at least 2-3 years. 
 
Sources: Maskus 2000; Helfer et al. 2009; 
Branstetter et al. 2006 
pressure or change in regime and the passage 
of the law. 
 
SOLUTION: We observe year-by-year trends 
leading up to the actual IPR reform and find no 
pre-trends. 
Internal 
government 
changes  
While external pressure from the WTO or the 
U.S. “watch list” was common among many 
countries, not all responded as quickly or 
willingly. Some countries resisted international 
demands for a few years until a new 
government with favorable views on IPR 
reform was elected. For example, India was 
unwilling to reform IP until a new party was 
elected in 1998 (reform was in 1999). 
Argentina and Brazil had similarly contentious 
internal processes. 
 
Sources: Correa 2000, Branstetter et al. 2006, 
Ryan 2010, Ramanna 2012 
1) If external pressure or the change in the 
government’s willingness to reform instead of 
actual IPR reform drives the effects, we should 
observe a pre-reform trend by which network 
changes occur in the window between 
pressure or change in regime and the passage 
of the law. 
 
2) Internal processes idiosyncratic to certain 
countries could drive the results 
 
SOLUTION: 1) We observe year-by-year trends 
leading up to the actual IPR reform and find no 
pre-trends. 2) We drop each of these countries 
from the analysis and find the results to be 
consistent.  
Regional 
spillovers 
Given the rise of regional treaties and broader 
liberalization during the period of study, there 
could be regional contagion in the timing of 
IPR reforms. 
 
Source: Peck & Tickell 2002  
If geographic spillovers affect the timing of 
reform, the timing of neighboring countries’ 
reforms may create anticipated changes in the 
network. 
 
SOLUTION: We control for the year in which 
neighboring countries in the region adopted 
IPR reform. We also observe year-by-year 
trends leading up to the actual IPR reform and 
find no pre-trends.  
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Level Panel Data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1), 321–349. Correa, C. M. (2000). Reforming the Intellectual Property Rights System 
in Latin America. World Economy, 23(6), 851–872. Fukuyama, F. (2006). The End of History and the Last Man. Simon and Schuster. Goldstein, P., 
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J., & Guerzovich, M. F. (2009). Islands of Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean 
Community. The American Journal of International Law, 103(1), 1–47. Hufbauer, G. C., & Schott, J. J. (1992). North American Free Trade: Issues 
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Table 3: Control Variables  
Control Variable Measure Source Reason for inclusion 
liberalization  
Dummy variable to indicate 
the year in which major 
economic liberalization 
occurred in each country 
Wacziarg and 
Welch (2008) 
Countries that pass IPR reforms may simultaneously be undergoing 
other changes that could influence alliance activity (see Table 2 and 
Henisz et al. 2005). Broader economic liberalization could lead to 
greater interaction with the outside world, which may manifest itself 
in terms of more cross-border alliances for reasons unrelated to IPR 
reform. 
capital flows openness  
0-100 scale, with 100 
representing an economy 
that is fully open 
Quinn and 
Toyoda 
(2008) 
The opening up of the economy to foreign capital may be correlated 
with IPR reforms, as these could be part of a suite of wider changes. 
Increased ease of capital flows may also make foreign firms more 
interested in partnering with firms from the reforming country. 
reformed neighbors 
Running count of the other 
countries in the same 
continent that already 
passed patent reforms 
Branstetter 
et al. (2006) 
IPR reform in a proximate country may lead the focal country to pass 
reforms, and potentially also create opportunities for firms from the 
focal country to access foreign partners but not due to the IPR reform 
per se. 
domestic alliances  
Logged count of number of 
alliances formed with firms 
from the same country 
SDC Platinum 
While our interest is on the formation of international alliances, the 
investment made in domestic alliances can enable or constrain firms 
in establishing foreign ties and it could be correlated with changes in 
IPR laws.  
political constraints 
(polcon) 
Number of veto players 
present in the country’s 
governing structure  
Henisz (2000) 
Level of political constraints could influence the timing and nature of 
the laws passed as well as the degree to which firms are able to 
influence the government to accelerate or delay laws according to 
business interests—including pressures for politicians to facilitate 
international alliances. 
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Table 3: Control Variables (continued) 
Control Variable Measure Source Reason for inclusion 
FDI inflows  
Dollar value (in billions) of 
total foreign direct 
investment into the 
country 
World Bank 
Indicative of the level of interest in the country from foreign investors. 
Could be correlated with a desire for, or a propensity to, pass 
institutional reforms as well as the likelihood in international alliances. 
hi-tech exports 
Dollar value (in billions) of 
the country's exports in 
products with high R&D 
intensity 
World Bank 
Captures the ability of the country's firms to produce products that 
are competitive with respect to the outside world. Could be a spur to 
pass reforms that promote trade. Could also be related to the 
attractiveness of firms from the focal country as alliance partners. 
flight takeoffs  
Number of commercial 
flight takeoffs from the 
country's airports 
World Bank 
Proxy for connectedness of focal country, both internally and with 
international markets. Could be indicative of degree of access to the 
outside world, which could be related to cross border alliance 
formation and propensity of country to pass reforms. 
cellphone connections  
Number of cellphone 
connections per 100 
people in the country 
World Bank Similar reasoning to above 
internet connectivity  
Number of Internet users 
per 100 people in the 
country 
World Bank Similar reasoning to above 
GNI per capita 
Gross National Income 
divided by the total 
population 
World Bank 
Improved economic growth could be correlated to economic reforms, 
but also a spur for foreign firms' interest in partnerships with local 
firms. 
urban population 
fraction  
Fraction of the country's 
population in urban areas 
World Bank 
Ease of access to labor, which may influence the interest of foreign 
firms in forming alliances with local firms and transferring IP-intensive 
operations to the local market.  
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Table 4: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
b – Logged Variable, Based on 11,072 firms  
Sl Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 New International Alliancesb 0.05 0.20 0 3.40 1
2 Av Ptn Cty High Tech Exports 0.39 2.01 0 19.75 0.68 1
3 Av Ptn Status 0.01 0.10 0 4.68 0.16 0.17 1
4 Partner International Diversity 0.03 0.12 0 0.93 0.44 0.22 0.14 1
5 Eigenvector 0.01 0.08 0 3.83 0.08 0.05 0.49 0.24 1
6 New domestic alliancesb 0.02 0.14 0 2.56 0.33 0.19 0.04 0.32 0.04 1
7 Liberalization dummy 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 1
8 Cap Flows openness 50.21 14.26 25 100 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.58 1
9 Reformed Neighbors 5.13 1.97 0 7 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.42 -0.16 1
10 PolCon 0.32 0.34 0 0.89 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.47 0.32 -0.17 1
11 FDI Inflows 0.19 0.19 -0.05 0.62 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.49 -0.23 0.39 -0.67 1
12 Hi-Tech Exports 0.35 0.64 0 2.73 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.31 -0.03 0.41 -0.43 0.75 1
13 Cellphone Connections 6.19 10.89 0 100.89 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.23 0.28 0.07 0.02 0.23 0.45 1
14 GNI per capita 1.53 1.87 0.33 16.12 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.60 0.57 -0.56 0.37 -0.15 -0.08 0.48 1
15 Internet connectivity 2.37 4.30 0 34.50 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.33 0.35 -0.01 0.16 0.06 0.26 0.88 0.49 1
16 Flight takeoffs 3.50 2.88 0.37 12.10 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.42 -0.15 0.38 -0.52 0.89 0.89 0.34 -0.11 0.15 1
17 Urban Pop. Fraction 40.66 17.86 25.55 89.90 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.62 0.46 -0.57 0.33 -0.12 -0.06 0.33 0.73 0.45 -0.01 1
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Table 5: Average Number of New International Alliances Formed by Firms in the 3 Year Window Pre 
and Post Reform (by Country) 
Country Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
Argentina 0.30 0.49 
Brazil 0.26 0.49 
Chile 0.01 0.30 
China 0.09 0.64 
Colombia 0.18 0.72 
India 0.21 0.32 
Indonesia 0.09 0.54 
Mexico 0.02 0.50 
Philippines 0.61 0.35 
Portugal 0.12 0.43 
Thailand 0.08 0.81 
Turkey 0.47 0.49 
Venezuela 0.63 0.95 
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Table 6: Baseline Effect of IPR Reforms on International Alliance Formation 
   Variable Model 2 
 
 
 Reform (t-5) or further -0.026* 
     (0.011) 
   Reform (t-4) 0.001 
     (0.009) 
   Reform (t-3) -0.008 
DV: New International Alliances    (0.007) 
Variable Model 1   Reform (t-2) -0.007 
Post Reform 0.019**    (0.005) 
  (0.004)  Reform (t) 0.014* 
New domestic alliances  0.424***    (0.005) 
  (0.029)  Reform (t+1) 0.023** 
Liberalization dummy -0.000    (0.007) 
  (0.006)  Reform (t+2) 0.012 
Cap Flows openness 0.000    (0.010) 
  (0.000)  Reform (t+3) 0.020* 
Reformed Neighbors 0.004+   (0.008) 
  (0.002)  Reform (t+4) 0.011 
PolCon 0.017    (0.007) 
  (0.014)  Reform (t+5) 0.021* 
FDI Inflows  0.014    (0.008) 
  (0.029)  Reform (t+6) 0.018+ 
Hi-Tech Exports 0.001    (0.008) 
  (0.008)  Reform (t+7) or further 0.018 
Cellphone Connections  0.000    (0.012) 
  (0.000)  Controls Y 
GNI per capita  0.001  Firm Fixed Effects Y 
  (0.002)  Year Fixed Effects Y 
Internet connectivity  0.001  Number of Firms 11,072 
  (0.001)  R2 (Within) 0.121 
Flight takeoffs  0.004    
  (0.003)    
Urban Pop. Fraction  -0.003*    
  (0.001)    
Constant 0.097*    
  (0.038)    
Firm Fixed Effects Y    
Year Fixed Effects Y    
Number of Firms 11,072    
R2 (Within) 0.121    
 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 + p<0.1; Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered 
by country 
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Table 7: Patent Intensive Industries 
Variable Model 3 
Post Reform 0.018** 
  (0.004) 
Post Reform x Patent Intensive 0.006* 
  (0.003) 
New domestic ties  0.424*** 
  (0.029) 
Liberalization dummy -0.000 
  (0.006) 
Cap Flows openness 0.000 
  (0.000) 
Reformed Neighbors 0.004+ 
  (0.002) 
PolCon 0.017 
  (0.014) 
FDI Inflows  0.013 
  (0.030) 
Hi-Tech Exports 0.001 
  (0.008) 
Cellphone Connections  0.000 
  (0.000) 
GNI per capita  0.001 
  (0.002) 
Internet connectivity  0.001 
  (0.001) 
Flight takeoffs  0.004 
  (0.003) 
Urban Pop. Fraction  -0.003* 
  (0.001) 
Constant 0.098* 
  (0.038) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y 
Number of Firms 11,072 
R2 (Within) 0.121 
 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 + p<0.1;  
Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by 
country. 
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Table 8: Average Number of New International Alliances for Firms that Form at least One International 
Alliance in the 3 Year Window pre and post Reform 
Country Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
Argentina 1.50 4.17 
Brazil 2.32 3.58 
China 2.13 4.02 
Colombia 3.50 4.00 
India 1.98 2.58 
Indonesia 1.67 4.33 
Mexico 1.00 2.00 
Philippines 3.06 2.55 
Portugal 1.25 2.25 
Thailand 2.91 6.91 
Turkey 2.41 2.65 
Venezuela 6.29 3.43 
 
 
Table 9: Number of Firms Forming International Alliances in the 3 Year Window pre and post Reform 
Country Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
Argentina 47 64 
Brazil 96 178 
China 281 1997 
Colombia 6 31 
India 271 397 
Indonesia 34 195 
Mexico 10 162 
Philippines 169 115 
Portugal 14 35 
Thailand 38 329 
Turkey 58 62 
Venezuela 20 44 
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Table 10: Distribution of Benefits from IPR Reforms                           Table 11: Major Cities 
DV: New International Alliances    Country Major Cities 
Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Argentina Buenos Aires 
Post Reform 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.035***  Brazil Brasilia, Sao Paulo 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)  Chile Santiago 
Eigenvector x Post Reform -0.288***      China Beijing, Shanghai 
  (0.044)      Colombia Bogota 
Major City x Post Reform     -0.008**  India New Delhi, Mumbai 
      (0.002)  Indonesia Jakarta 
New domestic ties  0.423*** 0.430*** 0.430***  Mexico Mexico City 
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)  Philippines Manila 
Liberalization dummy 0.002 -0.001 -0.001  Portugal Lisbon 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)  Thailand Bangkok 
Cap Flows openness 0.000 0.000 0.000  Turkey Istanbul 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  Venezuela Caracas 
Reformed Neighbors 0.004+ 0.005 0.005    
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)  
  
PolCon 0.019 0.031 0.031  
  
  (0.015) (0.019) (0.018)  
  
FDI Inflows  0.012 -0.009 -0.013  
  
  (0.029) (0.037) (0.037)  
  
Hi-Tech Exports 0.001 0.007 0.008  
  
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)  
  
Cellphone Connections  0.000 0.000 0.000  
  
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  
  
GNI per capita  0.001 0.001 0.001  
  
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)  
  
Internet connectivity  0.001 0.000 0.000  
  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
  
Flight takeoffs  0.004 0.006 0.006  
  
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  
  
Urban Pop. Fraction  -0.003* -0.005* -0.005*  
  
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  
  
Constant 0.105* 0.137+ 0.140*  
  
  (0.039) (0.064) (0.064)  
  
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y  
  
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y  
  
Number of Firms 11,072 4508 4508    
R2 (Within) 0.123 0.125 0.125    
 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 + p<0.1; Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered 
by country. Eigenvector is measured in the year prior to the reforms. Major City is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the firm 
is located in its county’s political or commercial capital. 
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Table 12: Effect of IPR Reforms on Quality of International Alliances 
Dependent Variable - 
 Avg. Partner Country 
High Tech Exports 
 Avg. Partner Country Sci 
Tech Journal Articles 
 Avg. Partner Status  Partner Diversity 
Variable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Post Reform 0.191*** 0.220*** 0.248*** 0.290*** 0.003+ 0.009*** 0.011* 0.012** 
  (0.032) (0.034) (0.053) (0.052) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Eigenvector x Post Reform   -2.122***   -3.054***   -0.452**   -0.143*** 
    (0.216)   (0.338)   (0.128)   (0.016) 
New domestic ties  2.567** 2.559** 1.739*** 1.729*** 0.021** 0.019** 0.203*** 0.202*** 
  (0.688) (0.690) (0.333) (0.334) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) 
Liberalization dummy 0.012 0.027 -0.051 -0.030 -0.004* -0.000 0.004 0.005 
  (0.045) (0.049) (0.069) (0.077) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cap Flows openness 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reformed Neighbors 0.011 0.013 0.060*** 0.062*** -0.003* -0.002* -0.004+ -0.004+ 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.010) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
PolCon 0.103 0.115 0.126 0.144 0.007+ 0.010+ 0.018 0.018 
  (0.104) (0.106) (0.122) (0.124) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) 
FDI Inflows  -0.458 -0.478 -0.621 -0.650 0.021+ 0.016 -0.009 -0.011 
  (0.351) (0.352) (0.557) (0.558) (0.011) (0.010) (0.032) (0.032) 
Hi-Tech Exports 0.007 0.006 -0.066 -0.068 0.004* 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.056) (0.059) (0.093) (0.096) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cellphone Connections  -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000+ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GNI per capita  0.012 0.012 0.005 0.004 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Internet connectivity  0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Flight takeoffs  0.075* 0.076* 0.083 0.084 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.048) (0.048) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban Pop. Fraction  -0.021+ -0.023+ -0.013 -0.016 -0.001+ -0.001* -0.002 -0.002+ 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.644 0.697+ 0.274 0.351 0.047* 0.058* 0.060+ 0.064+ 
  (0.368) (0.374) (0.338) (0.339) (0.018) (0.020) (0.032) (0.032) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of Firms 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 
R2 (Within) 0.045 0.046 0.020 0.022 0.007 0.033 0.110 0.112 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 + p<0.1; Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by country.  The DV in Models 11 
and 12 is the average eigenvector centrality of the focal firm’s partners. The coefficient on the Post Reform variable in model 11 has a p value of 0.057. 
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Table 13: Effect of IPR Reforms on Different Types of Alliances 
Dependent Variable - Knowledge alliances Manufacturing Alliances Marketing Alliances  R&D Alliances 
Variable Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
Post Reform 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.008** 0.010** 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.000 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Eigenvector x Post Reform   -0.233***   -0.114***   -0.099***   -0.045** 
    (0.029)   (0.015)   (0.023)   (0.011) 
New domestic ties  0.310*** 0.309*** 0.555*** 0.554*** 0.504*** 0.503*** 0.480*** 0.480*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.085) (0.085) (0.028) (0.029) 
Liberalization dummy 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004* -0.003+ -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cap Flows openness 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reformed Neighbors 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PolCon 0.016 0.017 0.001 0.002 0.007* 0.008* -0.002+ -0.002+ 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI Inflows  0.010 0.008 0.041** 0.040** -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.001 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hi-Tech Exports 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cellphone Connections  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GNI per capita  0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet connectivity  0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Flight takeoffs  0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban Pop. Fraction  -0.002+ -0.002+ -0.002* -0.002* -0.000+ -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.055 0.061+ 0.058* 0.061* 0.013 0.015+ -0.001 0.000 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.021) (0.021) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of Firms 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 11,072 
R2 (Within) 0.086 0.088 0.141 0.142 0.109 0.110 0.117 0.119 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 + p<0.1; Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by country
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Table 14: Effect of IPR Reforms on Domestic Alliances 
Dependent Variable - New Domestic Alliances 
New Domestic Alliances 
with local affiliates of 
Foreign Firms 
New Domestic Alliances 
with local firms 
Variable Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
Post Reform 0.014+ 0.014+ 0.002** 0.002** 0.012 0.012 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) 
Eigenvector x Post Reform   0.009   -0.003   0.010 
    (0.014)   (0.004)   (0.013) 
New international ties  0.226*** 0.226*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022) 
Liberalization dummy 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cap Flows openness 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reformed Neighbors -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
PolCon 0.027 0.027 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.023 0.023 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.016) 
FDI Inflows  -0.004 -0.004 0.008+ 0.008+ -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.004) (0.004) (0.031) (0.031) 
Hi-Tech Exports 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cellphone Connections  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GNI per capita  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
Internet connectivity  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Flight takeoffs  0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban Pop. Fraction  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.006) (0.006) (0.029) (0.029) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of Firms 10,033 10,033 10,033 10,033 10,033 10,033 
R2 (Within) 0.113 0.113 0.006 0.006 0.114 0.114 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 + p<0.1; Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and 
clustered by country 
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Table 15: Robustness 
DV: New International 
Alliances 
Unlogged DV No China No India 
No Alliances with US 
firms 
Variable Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 
Post Reform 0.031** 0.039*** 0.013* 0.017** 0.017* 0.021* 0.010* 0.012* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Eigenvector x Post Reform   -0.601***   -0.282***   -0.354**   -0.165*** 
    (0.128)   (0.041)   (0.087)   (0.035) 
New domestic alliances  0.803*** 0.801*** 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.440*** 0.439*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 
  (0.061) (0.062) (0.029) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.032) 
Liberalization dummy -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cap Flows openness 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reformed Neighbors 0.005 0.005 -0.000 -0.000 0.005* 0.005* 0.001 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PolCon 0.030 0.034 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.013 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
FDI Inflows  0.016 0.010 0.079 0.085 0.025 0.024 0.040 0.039 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.074) (0.074) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) 
Hi-Tech Exports 0.003 0.003 -0.047 -0.053 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.042) (0.042) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Cellphone Connections  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000+ -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GNI per capita  0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Internet connectivity  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.001+ 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Flight takeoffs  0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban Pop. Fraction  -0.005* -0.006* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002+ -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.159* 0.174* 0.067 0.072 0.059+ 0.065+ 0.103** 0.107** 
  (0.065) (0.067) (0.041) (0.040) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of Firms 11,072 11,072 5,926 5,926 9,143 9,143 11,072 11,072 
R2 (Within) 0.101 0.103 0.106 0.109 0.130 0.132 0.103 0.104 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 + p<0.1; Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered 
by country 
 
   
 
 
 
